Duffy vs Velez, (U.S. District Court)

Duffy vs Velez, (U.S. District Court)

Case no. 3:09-cv-05539-AET-LHG.

This was an  action filed under the Americans with Disabilities Act (the A.D.A.), (Westlaw citation is Duffy v. Velez, 2010 WL 503037, (D.N.J.,2010)) seeking an accommodation for the plaintiff, specifically,  waiver of the income cap in the Global Options Medicaid Program so that Mr. Duffy could reside in assisted living facility rather than a nursing home. State’s motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim was Denied February 5, 2010, by the Honorable Anne E. Thompson, U.S. D.J. (Case later was withdrawn/dismissed due to death of the plaintiff).

Attorney: Linda S. Ershow-Levenberg, Esq. and Lauren S. Marinaro, Esq.

Estate of M.M. vs Division of Medical Assistance & Health Services & Union County Board of Social Services

Estate of M.M. vs Division of Medical Assistance & Health Services & Union County Board of Social Services, OAL docket no. HMA 13911-08

Final Agency Decision May 2009 adopting the ALJ Initial Decision, reverses County Board’s action that penalized pre-eligibility transfers of assets and that denied eligibility on the basis that the Medicaid applicant wasn’t a resident of New Jersey at the time she sought care. The Agency confirmed the ALJ findings that MM had not relinquished her residency when she left the state for a prolonged vacation, and further, that transfers made to her daughters a year before the application were made exclusively for a reason unrelated to medicaid eligibility.

Attorney: Linda S. Ershow-Levenberg, Esq.

J.P. v. Division of Medical Assistance and Health Services

J.P. v. Division of Medical Assistance and Health Services, 392 N.J.Super. 295, 920 A.2d 707 (N.J.Super.A.D.,2007).

After a supplemental needs trust was created for a physically disabled wife and husband was ordered in divorce decree to pay $1550 per month in alimony to trust, county board of social services notified wife that the alimony would be considered income, for Medicaid purposes, to be paid over to the nursing facility where she resided. The Division of Medical Assistance and Health Services (DMAHS) determined that the alimony was income. Wife appealed.  The Superior Court, Appellate Division, S.L. Reisner, J.A.D., held that alimony received by a supplemental needs trust pursuant to divorce decree did not constitute income, for Medicaid purposes.

Attorney: Eugene Rosner, Esq.

W.T. v. Division of Medical Assistance and Health Services

W.T. v. Division of Medical Assistance and Health Services, 391 N.J.Super. 25, 916 A.2d 1066 (N.J.Super.A.D.,2007).

Appeal was taken from final agency decision of the Department of Human Services Division of Medical Assistance and Health Services (DMAHS) upholding the assessment of a transfer penalty delaying the effective date of institutionalized applicant’s participation in Medicaid program, based on an unequal distribution of marital assets between applicant and his spouse under property settlement agreement (PSA) incorporated into judgment of divorce. The Superior Court, Appellate Division, Collester, J.A.D., held that: (1) any in-house rule or policy of DMAHS, pursuant to which matrimonial settlements or divorce judgments providing equitable distribution of less than 50 percent of marital assets to an incapacitated spouse required a transfer penalty when made within look-back period, violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and state’s matrimonial law, and (2) the unequal distribution of marital assets under the PSA had as its purpose something other than qualifying applicant for Medicaid, and thus no transfer penalty was warranted. Reversed.

Attorney: Eugene Rosner, Esq.

Published Decision: https://law.justia.com/cases/new-jersey/appellate-division-published/2007/a0089-05-opn.html

I/M/O Estate of Denner, Chancery Div.–Union Cy.

38-4-3076 I/M/O Estate of Denner, Chancery Div.–Union Cy. (Lyons, P.J.Ch.) (8 pp.) (Unpublished decision dated Feb. 28, 2006, Released Mar. 1, 2006.)

The plaintiff  submitted three unsigned alternative documents which she claimed should be probated as writings intended to be a Will under the revised probate code, instead of the earlier Will that was probated by the defendant: (1) an unexecuted, typed will, apparently a form document, that has handwritten assertions and a cross-out that plaintiff alleges was prepared by the decedent; (2) an unsigned and undated handwritten list that plaintiff alleges was prepared by the decedent; and (3) an unexecuted will prepared by an attorney. Defendant moved to dismiss because none of the documents were signed by the decedent. The court denied that motion, allowing the trial to proceed. The court rejected defendant’s assertion of a per se bar to probating any document which has not been signed by a decedent, and viewed the more important issue as one of proof of the decedent’s intent.

Attorney: Eugene Rosner, Esq.